[New to the Journey? Read this for a brief introduction!]
by Kaye Dee
On 5 May, the Apollo-13 crew visited the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation factory in Bethpage, New York, to thank the company for its lifesaving Lunar Module, without which the recent lunar mission would have ended in disaster.
left to right: Apollo-13 astronauts Haise, Swigert, and Lovell during their visit to Grumman's Bethpage plant
The Grumman team’s contribution to the successful outcome of the mission – understanding the full capabilities of the vehicle they had designed so that it could be pressed into service as the astronauts’ lifeboat – is just one example of the innovativeness and dedication of the many NASA support teams working behind the scenes in the Apollo programme.
Today, I want to tell another behind-the-scenes story, one that comes “straight from the horse’s mouth”, as I’ve interviewed many of the personnel involved – the crucial role played by NASA’s space tracking networks, in particular the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) in Australia, in saving Apollo-13. I hope it will give you some insight into the complex technical and logistical operations that were required to respond to the emergency, and a feel for the urgency with which everyone was operating.
Practice Makes Perfect
When the team at the NASA Honeysuckle Creek MSFN station outside Canberra (which is operated by Australian contractor staff, not NASA personnel from the US) were participating in extensive pre-mission simulations about two weeks before the launch of Apollo 13, their training scripts included practicing to cope with any emergency that might arise -or at least any emergency that mission planners thought might feasibly arise, however remote the possibility. According to one Flight Controller on duty during Apollo-13, the complete failure of all the Command Module power systems was “so far down the line, if anyone had asked us to simulate it ahead of time we would all have said he was being unrealistic.”
In the above article for the Canberra Times, just three days before launch, Station Director Mr. Don Gray was quoted as saying “I have never seen anything as bad as we make it in these tests actually happen yet.” Little did he know then that this would turn out to be the most ironic statement of the year, as the MSFN – and Honeysuckle Creek in particular – was about to face a situation even more challenging than any simulation!
A view of HSK at night, taken just a few days ago
Keeping Track
I’ve written about NASA’s space tracking networks in some previous manned spaceflight articles, so for those new to the Journey, let me encourage you to read my pieces on Apollo-8 and 11 for more background on these vital segments of NASA’s space support infrastructure.
Three MSFN stations were specifically established to support Apollo lunar missions: Goldstone in California, Honeysuckle Creek, and Fresnedillas, near Madrid, Spain. Each of these stations has been sited close to a Deep Space Network (DSN) station, which support NASA’s unmanned lunar and planetary exploration probes. Since the two types of station share the same technology, the DSN station can back-up the MSFN in the event of failure during a lunar mission.
When the Command Module and Lunar Module are operating independently during the lunar phase of an Apollo mission, the paired DSN and MSFN stations can support one spacecraft each, ensuring more efficient communication with Mission Control for both vehicles.
Additional support during launch, Trans Lunar Injection and re-entry, when the Apollo spacecraft might be out of contact with ground stations, is provided by three tracking ships and a fleet of eight Apollo Range Instrumented Aircraft (ARIA), stationed in the United States and Australia.
NASA tracking ship USNS Vanguard is often based in Sydney during Apollo missions
Something’s Wrong!
Almost before Apollo-13 Command Module Pilot Jack Swigert could tell Mission Control "Houston, we've had a problem”, operations personnel at the Goldstone (callsign GDN) and Honeysuckle Creek (callsign HSK) stations knew there was something wrong. At the time, both stations could “see” the spacecraft, but at 13:08 Australian Eastern Standard Time (another 13 in this mission’s supposed catalogue of unlucky numbers!) they suddenly lost their lock on the Command Module’s signal.
As the receiver operators tried to re-acquire communication, they were only able to find a weak signal coming from the spacecraft, which had switched from its main S-Band high-gain antenna to the smaller omni antennae. This was probably due to the panel blown out of the side of the Service Module hitting the big antenna on its way past.
View of the damage to Apollo-13's Service Module showing where the panel blew out. The probably-damaged main S-Band antenna is to the lower left of the damaged section
This weaker signal combined with the erratic behaviour of the spacecraft following the explosion caused the receiver operators at GDS, HSK, and Madrid (MAD) in its turn, difficulty in holding onto the weak, fluctuating signal with their 85ft antennae for the rest of the mission.
Australia Pitches in to Help
Listening to the tense conversations between the Odyssey and Mission Control at Honeysuckle Creek, they first thought there was a communications problem with the spacecraft, but the seriousness of the crisis was brought home to them when Houston called the Operations Supervisor at HSK to ask, “How long would it take to get Parkes up?”
The Parkes Radio Telescope (NASA callsign PKS), is Australia’s world-leading 210ft radio astronomy instrument, which NASA “hires” on occasion to support planetary probes and Apollo missions: the majority of the lunar surface television from the Apollo-11 mission was brought to the world via the Parkes telescope. It was not scheduled to receive Apollo-13’s lunar television, because the astronauts would have been using a big portable umbrella antenna for communications from the lunar surface.
The Parkes Radio Telescope stands in open paddocks about 20 miles from the town that gives it its name. This view was taken around the time of Apollo-12
It was at this point that Station Director Gray realised how serious Apollo-13’s situation really was: “You don’t just casually ask to use the antenna at Parkes without making high level arrangements with plenty of warning.” Mission Control needed good telemetry from the Command and Service Modules to diagnose the spacecraft issues – and with Apollo-13 soon to pass out of range of the 210ft dish at the Goldstone DSN station, Parkes, with its much greater sensitivity than the MSFN's 85ft antennae, offered the best opportunity to capture the fluctuating telemetry and communications signals from the Lunar Module when Apollo-13’s Command Module was powered down to conserve its batteries for use during re-entry.
With carte blanche from NASA to do and spend whatever was necessary to get the radio telescope operational in its PKS mode as soon as possible, Australia swung into action!
In Record Time
To get PKS operational, technicians from Honeysuckle Creek’s DSN twin station, Tidbinbilla (TID), together with the technical staff at the radio telescope (operated by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, or CSIRO) accomplished in just ten hours, what it would normally take them a week to complete!
Apollo-12 communication and telemetry equipment installed at the Parkes Radio Telescope, available for use during the Apollo-13 emergency
While a crew from TID flew the 200 miles to Parkes in a hastily-arranged Cessna, arrangements were made with the Director of the Parkes telescope, Dr. John Bolton, to convert it from radio astronomy to NASA use. The Indian researcher using the telescope at the time agreed to delay his project, and the engineers supporting him removed his equipment while Parkes staff began to install NASA equipment that was still onsite from Apollo-12. To configure the equipment, NASA hastily flew out one of its experienced communication engineers from the Goddard Space Flight Centre, which manages tracking and communications for the Apollo programme. CSIRO also made arrangements to send additional supplies and personnel from Sydney by plane. Everyone worked 16-hour days until Apollo-13 was safely back on Earth.Catching some rest at the end of a 16-hour shift at Parkes
Making Connections
To enable PKS to send the signals it received back to the United States, temporary connections had to be made between the facility, NASA’s communications control centre in Sydney and the satellite communications ground station located in Moree in north-western New South Wales.
Cover of a brochure showing the Overseas Telecommunications Commission's INTELSAT ground station at Moree, used to send NASA data via satellite to the United States
Domestic communications in Australia are managed by the PMG (Post Master General’s Department). They, too, immediately swung into action, sending technicians out in the dead of night to re-connect the temporary microwave links between Parkes and Sydney. “We dropped everything we were doing with the state networks and concentrated on the Apollo circuits,” as they expected that PKS, HSK and TID would play a crucial role after the spacecraft’s trans-Earth injection.
Teams from the PMG, the Australian Broadcasting Commission and private contractors, installed temporary microwave circuits from Parkes and Canberra, which involved the erection of six aerials up to 60 feet high in the middle of the night. The microwave links were installed across hundreds of miles in around 12 hours!
NASA also wanted a high-capacity data link between the MSFN tracking station in Carnarvon (CRO), in remote northern Western Australia and its INTELSAT ground station two and a half miles away. At just 30ft, CRO might have had a much smaller antenna than HSK, TID and PKS, but NASA wanted everything they could get.
Two outside broadcast vans were despatched from Perth to make the almost 600-mile trip to Carnarvon to connect the two stations there. “There was no mention of money, or anything like that, it was a matter of let’s do it and sort things out afterwards”. Rescuing Apollo-13 was more important than budget or bureaucracy! The 30ft Apollo tracking antenna at Carnarvon MSFN station. Primarily used for tracking Apollo missions in Earth orbit, it could detect signals out to near-lunar distances
Untangling Signals
In my Apollo-13 article, I noted how communications difficulties arose between the Lunar Module (LM) Aquarius and Mission Control because it was using the same frequency as the mission’s spent S-IVB stage, which was following Apollo-13 to the Moon.
The mission plan was for Apollo-13’s S-IVB rocket to crash on the Moon, so that the impact could be detected by the Passive Seismic Experiment left by Apollo-12. Extra batteries had been added to the rocket stage so that it was communicating until impact. Had the mission gone to plan, the S-IVB would have impacted with the Moon well before the LM was fired up.
The Apollo-12 Passive Seismic Experiment which detected the impact of Apollo-13's S-IVB stage on the lunar surface
With both the S-IVB and LM transmitters on the same frequency, it was like having two radio stations on the same spot on the dial of your radio. Which signal does the receiver try to lock onto?
At Goldstone, with Apollo-13 still in view when the emergency began, the 210ft dish, with its narrower beam-width, managed to discriminate between the two signals and the telemetry and voice links were restored. But in Australia, until PKS was operational Honeysuckle Creek would be tracking with its smaller 85ft antenna. Its ten receivers could randomly lock onto one signal or the other – and that is what happened!
HSK used a technique employed in the Deep Space Network to lock onto faint signals from interplanetary probes amidst the “background noise” of the galaxy to “pull” the frequencies apart by tuning the station transmitters appropriately.
An incorrect decision by Mission Control to tune the frequency of one transmitter in a particular way then brought all the frequencies back together again! The presence of two uplink carrier signals caused interference that the crew was hearing.
Tense moments at Honeysuckle Creek while the tangled signals from Apollo-13 and its S-IVB stage are unravelled
Fortunately, an emergency procedure previously developed and practised at HSK ultimately resolved this issue. “The only way out of this mess was to ask the astronauts in the LM to turn off its signal so we could lock on to the S-IVB, then turn the LM back on and pull [its signal] away from the Saturn signal. When we could see the Saturn-IV downlink go way out to the prescribed frequency, we put the second uplink on, acquired the LM, put the sidebands on, locked up and tuned away from the S-IVB. Then everything worked fine.”
The Final Leg
With the big dishes at Goldstone and Parkes both operational, and support from the smaller antennae in the US, Australia and Spain, the reliable communications established between Mission Control and the Apollo-13 astronauts made possible by the Manned Space Flight Network and its DSN twins was a crucial factor in saving the mission that has been dubbed a “successful failure”.
Elements of the MSFN supported Apollo-13 all the way to splashdown. CRO used its powerful FPQ6 radar to observe the separation of the Command Service Modules, as well as Odyssey and Aquarius. It also tracked the Odyssey as it made its unusual "foldback" track over the Indian Ocean.
Chart showing Apollo-13's re-entry ground track. It gives a good idea of the ‘foldback’ or reversal of Apollo 13’s ground track as its increased speed towards re-entry reversed its direction with respect to the Earth. The Australian MSFN stations are also marked.
Honeysuckle Creek was the last ground station to track the re-entry phase of the mission when Apollo-13 re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere and crossed eastwards across Australia, but three ARIA aircraft, flying out of Australia were on station. They were waiting to make contact after the re-entry blackout and see Apollo-13 to the completion of its odyssey: ARIA 2 was about 300 nautical miles up-track from the predicted splashdown point, ARIA 4 was near the predicted point, and ARIA 3 was about 300 nautical miles down-track, in case the Command Module Apollo-13 overshot the landing target.
ARIA 4 tracking aircraft on the ground at Perth Airport, Western Australia, before taking up station to support Apollo-13's safe splashdown
Well-Deserved Recognition
Too often, the dedicated “we’ll do what it takes” effort behind-the-scenes of a major event goes un-noticed, so it is worth noting that the work of the MSFN and DSN facilities in Australia, along with that of Parkes and the CSIRO, PMG and supporting contractors was recognised with commendation in the Australian Parliament and from the Goddard Space Flight Centre Network Director. President Nixon himself sent the message below to Australian Prime Minister Mr. John Gorton.
Without the efforts of hundreds of NASA, contractor and local communications network personnel across the world to maintain contact with the stricken spacecraft, enabling vital communication between the astronauts and Mission Control, the outcome of the Apollo-13 emergency might have been very different. Thanks to training, professional competence and determination, it has become instead an outstanding example of "the perfect emergency".
[New to the Journey? Read this for a brief introduction!]